Central bank communication during normal and crisis time by Blot, Christophe & Hubert, Paul
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Central Bank 
Communication 
during Normal and 
Crisis Times 
Monetary Dialogue September 2018 
 
Policy Department for Economic, Scientific and Quality of Life Policies  
Authors: Christophe Blot and Paul Hubert 
Directorate-General for Internal Policies 
PE 626.068 - September 2018 
EN 
IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS 
Requested by the ECON committee 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Central banks have intensified their communication strategy since 
the mid 1990’s and it has become an important instrument of 
central banks’ policymaking toolkit. A large empirical evidence 
suggests that central bank communication has effectively 
enhanced the transmission of monetary policy before and during 
the financial crisis. Nevertheless, the use of communication as a 
policy instrument is fragile since it depends on economic agents’ 
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communication be consistent with policy decisions. 
This document was provided by Policy Department A at the 
request of the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee. 
 
Central bank 
Communication 
during Normal and 
Crisis Times 
Monetary Dialogue September 2018 
This document was requested by the European Parliament's Committee on Economic and Monetary 
Affairs. 
 
 
AUTHORS 
Christophe BLOT, Sciences Po, OFCE & Université Paris-Nanterre – EconomiX 
Paul HUBERT, Sciences Po, OFCE 
 
ADMINISTRATOR RESPONSIBLE  
Dario PATERNOSTER 
 
EDITORIAL ASSISTANT  
Janetta CUJKOVA 
 
LINGUISTIC VERSIONS 
Original: EN 
 
 
 
 
ABOUT THE EDITOR 
Policy departments provide in-house and external expertise to support EP committees and other 
parliamentary bodies in shaping legislation and exercising democratic scrutiny over EU internal 
policies. 
 
To contact the Policy Department or to subscribe for updates, please write to:  
Policy Department for Economic, Scientific and Quality of Life Policies 
European Parliament 
B-1047 Brussels 
Email: Poldep-Economy-Science@ep.europa.eu  
 
Manuscript completed in September 2018 
© European Union, 2018 
 
This document is available on the internet at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/econ/monetary-dialogue.html 
 
DISCLAIMER AND COPYRIGHT 
The opinions expressed in this document are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not 
necessarily represent the official position of the European Parliament.  
Reproduction and translation for non-commercial purposes are authorised, provided the source is 
acknowledged and the European Parliament is given prior notice and sent a copy.
Central Bank Communication at Times of Non-Standard Monetary Policies 
 
PE 626.068 3 
CONTENTS 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 4 
LIST OF FIGURES 5 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 6 
 INTRODUCTION 7 
 WHY DO CENTRAL BANKS COMMUNICATE ON MONETARY POLICY? 10 
2.1. The theoretical reasons for more central bank communication 10 
2.2. Central bank communication in normal times 10 
 CENTRAL BANKS COMMUNICATION DURING CRISIS TIMES 12 
3.1. QE announcements 12 
3.2. Forward guidance 17 
3.3. “Whatever it takes” 19 
 THE INFLUENCE OF CENTRAL BANK COMMUNICATION ON THE EFFECT OF POLICY 
DECISIONS 21 
 CONCLUSION 22 
REFERENCES 23 
 
  
IPOL | Policy Department for Economic, Scientific and Quality of Life Policies 
 
 4 PE 626.068 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
ECB European Central Bank 
BoE Bank of England 
FOMC Federal Open Market Committee 
CBPP Covered bonds purchase programme 
MBS Mortgage Backed Securities 
MRO Main Refinancing Operations 
QE Quantitative Easing 
SMP Securities market programme 
VLTRO Very long-term refinancing operations 
ZLB Zero lower bound 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Central Bank Communication at Times of Non-Standard Monetary Policies 
 
PE 626.068 5 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1: Occurrence of four “central bank communication” terms in books in English 7 
Figure 2: Speeches given by central bank committee members 8 
Figure 3: Comparison of Transparency Index in 2008 and 2014 9 
Figure 4: High-frequency effects of the 5 Fed announcements of securities purchases 13 
Figure 5: High-frequency effects of the 6 Fed announcements of securities purchases 15 
Figure 6: Intraday change in 10-year sovereign yields at the APP announcement dates 16 
Figure 7: Reaction of Bund yields around the announcements of (i) the size of the APP and             
(ii) the maturities’ range of the purchases during the 22 January Press Conference 17 
Figure 8: The effect of forward guidance announcements at different maturities 18 
Figure 9: Italy and Spain: 10-year government bond yields 19 
Figure 10: Euro-Dollar exchange rate on March 10, 2016 20 
Figure 11: Responses of inflation expectations to a restrictive monetary shock 21 
 
 
IPOL | Policy Department for Economic, Scientific and Quality of Life Policies 
 
 6 PE 626.068 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Background 
Central banks communication has been crucial during the crisis, but the increasing trend in central 
bank communication preceded the financial crisis. It has been certainly motivated by the request of 
increased transparency and accountability of independent institutions in charge of the conduct of 
monetary policy. Beyond the institutional argument, central banks communication is also instrumental 
to enhance the transmission of monetary policy as it conveys information on the present and future 
stance of monetary policy. 
Aim  
• All indicators assessing central banks communication show a steady increase since the mid 1990’s 
indicating that it has become a major issue. The financial crisis has reinforced this trend. 
• Communication matters as it makes centrals banks decisions more transparent. On the one hand, 
transparency of monetary policy is needed to make independent central bank accountable of their 
decisions. On the other hand, communication may enhance the transmission of monetary policy. 
• There is a large empirical evidence suggesting that communication provides central banks with an 
instrument to influence economic agents’ expectations of future monetary policy decisions, 
strengthening central banks’ ability to achieve their goals. 
• The role of communication has been reinforced during the financial crisis when the policy rate has 
been constrained by the zero lower bound. Central banks have sought to influence asset prices and 
interest rate expectations through the announcement of several non-standard measures.  
• The “forward guidance” policy implemented by the ECB was a major change, following years of “we 
never pre-commit”, a usual mantra by Jean-Claude Trichet. 
• Non-standard monetary policy measures adopted during the financial crisis worked mainly 
through the confidence and signalling channels, so through central bank announcements of these 
policies. One key example of the powerful effect of communication on sovereign yields has been 
the famous “whatever it takes” announcement by ECB President. 
• There is a large evidence of sizeable effect of central banks communication on financial market 
variables such as asset prices, yields and exchange rates. 
• Nevertheless, the use of communication as a policy instrument is fragile. Imperfectly controlled 
communication may trigger adverse effect or mitigate the expected impact of an announcement. 
Central banks need to implement  consistent communication, which shall also be consistent with 
their policy decisions. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
 
In June 1995, Alan Greenspan, a former chairman of the Federal Reserve said to a business audience “If 
I’ve made myself too clear, you must have misunderstood me”. At that time, communication was in its 
infancy and its role for the conduct of monetary policy was still stammering. Two decades later, central 
banking has entered a new era where communication plays a central role in the definition and 
implementation of monetary policy. Since the mid-nineties, monetary policy strategy has markedly 
increased the use communication tools such as “central bank transparency”, “central bank 
communication”, “inflation reports” or “central bank forecasts” (figure 1). Central bankers are now 
undoubtedly expected to communicate and to be transparent on the goals of monetary policy as well 
as the expected effect of their decisions. 
 
Figure 1: Occurrence of four “central bank communication” terms in books in English  
 
Source: Google Ngram Viewer. Sample period: 1975-2008. 
 
Communication stands for all the way through which central banks disseminate information to a large 
audience: households, firms, financial markets, scientific community, members of Parliament. It is now 
usual for central banks to publish press releases to inform about the monetary policy decisions 
adopted, to publish statements explaining those decisions and to hold press conferences to answer 
questions and provide information about the central banks’ forecast on the economic, monetary and 
financial variables. The ECB has been using such communication tools since its onset in 1999. Over the 
same time span, this has been the case also for other major central banks and notably the Federal 
KEY FINDINGS 
Communication has become a major tool for central banks. Empirical evidence confirms the 
effectiveness of communication for the transmission of monetary policy. During the financial 
crisis, several announcements such as the “whatever it takes” by ECB President and the 
implementation of a forward guidance strategy have played a key role in shaping the term 
structure of interest rates and reducing sovereign yields in the euro area. Recent evidence also 
suggests that central bank communication should be consistent with policy decisions. 
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Reserve. However, until 1994 monetary policy decisions in the US were not explicitly communicated by 
the Federal Reserve.1 The stance of monetary policy had to be inferred afterwards, from the Fed 
interventions on the funds market.  
 
Figure 2: Speeches given by central bank committee members 
 
Source: Lustenberger and Rossi (2017). Note: Sample includes 73 countries. 
 
Some central banks have gone one step further and provide information on the internal decision-
making process. The Bank of England and the Federal Reserve issue minutes with details on the 
discussions held during their meeting and potential dissent among board members. The votes are also 
published. Regular publications such as the ECB Economic Bulletin and the BoE Inflation Report also 
provide in-depth assessments on the economic, monetary and financial developments and outlook. 
Members of the Governing Council give regular interviews, speeches, have interactions with other 
stakeholders (analysts, researchers) and hearings to MEPs. A large body of literature has confirmed the 
rising trend of communication and transparency.2 Lustenberger and Rossi (2017) have identified nearly 
900 speeches given by central banks committee members of 73 countries in 2013 and 2014 compared 
to less than 100 in 1998 (Figure 2). The financial crisis and the implementation of non-standard 
measures have certainly reinforced the need for explanations of policy decisions. However, the trend 
was already rising before 2007.  
Indicators of transparency, such as the one computed by Dincer and Eichengreen (2014) for a large 
panel of central banks around the world, highlight that central banks communication has increased 
during the financial crisis illustrating the effort made to explain central banks decisions featuring 
additional and non-standard monetary policy instruments (Figure 3). 
                                           
1  In 1994, policy decisions were communicated through a press release and the Federal Reserve started to publish 
statement explaining those decisions in 1999. 
2  See Eijffinger and Geraats (2006), Crowe and Meade (2007) and Dincer and Eichengreen (2014). 
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Figure 3: Comparison of Transparency Index in 2008 and 2014 
 
Source: Based on Dincer and Eichengreen (2014) and updated in September 2015. 
 
This policy brief aims at emphasizing the role and importance of central banks communication in 
modern central banking. It notably sheds some lights on the role played by communication and its 
limit for the effectiveness of monetary policy transmission, both in normal times and during crisis. The 
rest of the paper is organized as follows. The second section deals with the issue of active central banks 
communication and the role it is expected to play in normal times. In the third section, we focus on the 
specific issues related to central banks communication during crisis. Finally, section four stress that 
central banks communication interacts with policy decisions so that central bankers should avoid 
conveying opposite signals to the market.  
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 WHY DO CENTRAL BANKS COMMUNICATE ON MONETARY 
POLICY? 
2.1. The theoretical reasons for more central bank communication 
The development of communication stems notably from the will to make monetary policy more 
transparent, which is inherently related to the independence of central banks. The trend towards more 
independence started in the eighties and has progressively expanded from industrialized to emerging 
and developing countries.3 The implementation of monetary policy is now generally delegated to non-
elected bodies: central banks which have been assigned objectives regarding price stability, full 
employment and often financial stability tasks. With important policy decisions taken by non-elected 
bodies but pursuing social goals, there is a need to make these institutions accountable. Transparency 
shall help politicians and citizens to assess whether central banks decisions comply with the assigned 
objectives and tasks. 
Besides, central bank communication also matters for the effectiveness of monetary policy. It is not 
only motivated by the desire to inform, but also to explain the decisions implemented. Its main purpose 
is to manage economic agents’ expectations, especially short-term interest rate expectations, in turn 
affecting (future) long-term interest, which are that are key drivers for consumption and investment 
decisions. 
By shaping the term-structure of interest rates, central banks communication can affect the growth-
inflation pattern of the economy. According to Goodfriend (1991), “by making itself more predictable 
to the markets, the central bank makes market reactions to monetary policy more predictable to itself. 
And that makes it possible to do a better job of managing the economy”. 
2.2. Central bank communication in normal times 
Before the crisis, it was already recognized that communication played a role for the transmission of 
monetary policy. The issue of the effect of communication had already been analysed. Guthrie and 
Wright (2000) find that announcements made by the Federal Bank of New Zealand triggered changes 
in interest rates beyond the impact of open market operations. Blinder et al. (2008) provide a 
comprehensive survey of empirical evidence suggesting that central bank “communication can be an 
important and powerful part of the central bank's toolkit since it has the ability to move financial 
markets, to enhance the predictability of monetary policy decisions, and potentially to help achieve 
central banks' macroeconomic objectives”. 
For instance, Ehrmann et al. (2012) study the effects of increased central bank transparency and 
communication on the dispersion among professional forecasters of key economic variables in a panel 
of 12 advanced economies. They find evidence for sizeable effects stemming from the announcement 
of a quantified inflation objective and the publication of inflation and output forecasts. However, they 
also find evidence for diminishing marginal effects related to increases in transparency, while the 
disagreement among the public is not affected. This may suggests that there are limits to transparency 
for the effectiveness of monetary policy.4 In a similar vein, Neuenkirch (2012) studies the influence of 
central bank transparency and informal central banks communication on the formation of money 
market expectations for a panel of nine major central banks from January 1999 to July 2007. He finds 
that transparency reduces the bias in money market expectations compared to the policy path and 
                                           
3  See Crowe and Meade (2007), Dincer and Eichengreen (2014). 
4  Transparency is yet still an important feature of central banking to improve accountability. 
Central Bank Communication at Times of Non-Standard Monetary Policies 
 
PE 626.068 11 
dampens their variation. He also shows that speeches by policymakers help manage financial market 
expectations by reducing the variation of expectations. Finally, he finds that the explanation of interest 
rate decisions leads to a smaller bias in expectations and that the explicit prioritization of objectives 
and provision of information on unanticipated macroeconomic disturbances leads to a reduction in 
the variation of expectations.  
Sturm and De Haan (2011) examine whether the ECB communication adds information compared to 
the information provided by a Taylor rule model in which real-time expected inflation and output 
growth are used. They track five indicators based on ECB President’s introductory statements at the 
press conference following an ECB policy meeting. Results suggest that the information content 
provided by the indicators helps to predict the future ECB policy decisions. Jansen and De Haan (2009) 
assess the impact of such terms as `vigilance', `vigilant' or variations thereof in ECB communications as 
indicators of ECB's perception of risks to price stability and for predicting its policy decisions. According 
to the authors, between 2005 and 2008, media and financial markets did interpret the presence of 
those terms in ECB statements as signals for future interest rate hikes. 
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 CENTRAL BANKS COMMUNICATION DURING CRISIS TIMES 
As emphasized above, central banks communication has now become a common monetary policy tool, 
aiming at shaping interest rate expectations and influencing asset prices. During the financial crisis, the 
short-term policy rate reached the zero lower bound (ZLB) and central banks lost the ability to 
implement additional stimulus through standard instruments.  
Non-standard measures aimed at circumventing the zero lower bound and increased the role of 
communication in the transmission of monetary policy. Quantitative easing programmes through 
assets purchases and forward guidance on interest rates enabled central banks to implement 
additional stimulus once the ZLB was reached. These measures affect expectations on the dynamics of 
future interest rate and increase confidence in the economy.  
Even though central banks cannot reduce the policy rate further, they may affect the term structure of 
interest rates by reducing expected short-term interest rates. The transmission notably hinged on the 
signalling and confidence channel. The implementation of quantitative easing (QE) did signal that the 
stance of monetary policy would remain expansionary over an extended period. 
3.1. QE announcements  
The transmission of monetary policy is passed through its effect on financial variables: market interest 
rates, asset prices, exchange rate… As these variables are forward-looking, they may capture the effect 
of monetary policy measures, implemented later. Consequently, the time of announcement matters. 
Empirical literature has largely resorted to event-studies to assess the effect of QE.5 This methodology 
consists in observing the change of selected financial variables around policy announcements. 
Assuming that no other information on the macroeconomic and financial environment is released, the 
change of a variable measures the effect of the announcement on its expectations. Consequently, even 
an expansionary measure may have a negative impact on stock prices if, for instance, it turns out to be 
less expansionary compared to what agents expected before the announcement. 
Most empirical analyses have focused on expansionary measures: announcements of QE and extension 
of QE measures. The main message from this literature is that expansionary measures have been 
effective in reducing long-term interest rates and boosting stock prices. Now that central banks have 
started to normalize – the Federal Reserve – or consider normalizing monetary policy in the near future 
– the ECB – the reaction of financial markets deserves attention. As central banks aim at an orderly 
normalization of financial markets, their communications strategy avoids triggering sharp increases in 
interest rate as this may risk to derail the recovery. The “tapering” speech pronounced by Ben Bernanke 
in May 2013 may be seen as an example of inappropriate communication that led to a reversal of 
economic agents’ expectations regarding the stance of monetary policy and resulted in a substantial 
and unwanted rise in long-term interest rates. 
                                           
5  See Szczerbowicz (2015) on the effect of VLTRO (very long-term refinancing operations), CBPP (covered bonds purchase 
programme) and SMP (securities market programme) implemented by the ECB. 
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Figure 4: High-frequency effects of the 5 Fed announcements of securities purchases  
 
 
 
Source: Blot and Hubert (2017). 
 
Blot and Hubert (2017) have realized an event-study to analyse 11 Fed QE announcements, among 
which 5 were announcements of securities purchases: 
• March 18, 2009 Announcement of QE1: purchases of securities for $ 1,150 billion 
• November 3, 2010 Announcement of QE2: purchases of securities for $ 600 billion 
• September 21, 2011 Announcement of the twist transaction: purchases of securities of long 
maturity / sale of securities of short maturity 
• September 13, 2012 QE3 Announcement: Monthly purchases of MBS for $ 40 billion 
• December 12, 2012 QE3 Announcement: Monthly purchases of Treasuries for $ 45 billion 
and 6 announcements of reductions in security purchases (either indicating the slowdown of monthly 
asset purchase or the decrease of the size of the balance sheet):  
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• May 1, 2013 The Federal Reserve is ready to increase or decrease its purchases 
• May 22, 2013 Tapering speech by Ben Bernanke 
• June 19, 2013 The Federal Reserve is ready to increase or decrease its purchases 
• December 18, 2013 Announcement of Reduction of Securities Purchases by $ 10 Billion 
• June 14, 2017 Announcement of plan to reduce balance sheet size to an undefined date 
• September 20, 2017 Announcement of the reduction in balance sheet size. 
The response of selected variables to the above announcements has been fairly differentiated (figure 
4). Regarding the euro-dollar exchange rate, the announcement of QE-I had more pronounced effect 
on the exchange rate leading to a significant dollar depreciation. Other announcements had either 
smaller effect of even led to a small dollar appreciation. The same holds for the S&P 500 and for the 
spread between Baa bonds and Treasuries. Considering measures indicating a reduction in the size of 
the QE or announcing the path for the reduction of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet, we may notice 
that announcement on the tapering in May and June 2013 have been followed by a reduction in stock 
prices (figure 5). Comparatively, the announcement on the reduction of the size of the balance sheet 
had minor effect on stock prices. Actually, a depreciation of the dollar set in suggesting that the period 
for the phasing out of non-standard measures has been longer to what was expected. The strategy was 
then seen as less restrictive. 
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Figure 5: High-frequency effects of the 6 Fed announcements of securities purchases  
 
 
 
Source: Blot and Hubert (2017). 
 
These results highlight the role of communication for the exit strategy that will be implemented by the 
ECB. Undesirable effects of the reduction of asset purchases and of the size of the balance sheet may 
not necessarily be followed by a significant fall in asset prices. Communication will still play a crucial 
role for steering expectations and interest rates in the euro area. The strategy of gradual tapering from 
QE is warranted as long as the recovery in the euro area remains fragile and not shared by a large 
majority of countries. Analysing uncertainty, Coenen et al. (2017) also show that announcements have 
not always the same impact. Some decisions may increase uncertainty while other would decrease it. 
The information conveyed by the central bank would consequently matter. 
IPOL | Policy Department for Economic, Scientific and Quality of Life Policies 
 
 16 PE 626.068 
Figure 6: Intraday change in 10-year sovereign yields at the APP announcement dates  
 
Source: Altavilla, Carboni and Motto (2015) and Thomson Reuters. Note: The solid (blue) line represents movements on 22 
January 2015 (LHS axis) and dashed (red) line represents movements on 6 March 2015 (RHS axis). Vertical lines represent the 
start of the ECB Press Conference. 
 
This intuition is illustrated by Altavilla, Carboni and Motto (2015) who focus on the effect of the 
announcement of the Asset Purchase Programme (APP), i.e. the quantitative easing program 
implemented by the ECB. First, they assess the intraday change in sovereign yields following the first 
QE announcement of 22 January 2015 and further details provided by the ECB on 6 March 2015. Their 
results confirm previous evidence on the significant impact of announcement of expansionary 
measures. Following both announcements, German, French, Italian and Spanish sovereign yields have 
decreased significantly (figure 6). Altavilla et al., have also disentangled the impact of the 
announcement on the amount of assets purchases (size effect) from the impact of the maturity 
structure (the maturity effect). For German yields, their analysis suggests that the “maturity” effect was 
stronger than the “size” effect (figure 7). 
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Figure 7: Reaction of Bund yields around the announcements of (i) the size of the APP and 
(ii) the maturities’ range of the purchases during the 22 January Press 
Conference  
 
Source: Altavilla, Carboni and Motto (2015) and Thomson Reuters. Note: Each diamond/circle represents the change in 
individual bonds. 
 
3.2. Forward guidance 
The forward guidance policy is also representative of the evolution of the communication during the 
crisis. Jean-Claude Trichet, the former ECB President, used to say “We never pre-commit”, indicating 
that central bankers were reluctant to provide a path for future monetary policy decisions and that 
decisions taken today would be reversed if the economic outlook justifies to change the stance of 
monetary policy. During the crisis, the need to anchor expectations for interest rates at low levels has 
led ECB President Mario Draghi (and other central bankers) to introduce the so-called forward guidance 
on interest rates for the first time in July 2013. 
The effectiveness of forward guidance depends on its credibility. To deal with the issue of credibility, 
forward guidance is often associated to the pattern of certain economic indicators (conditioned 
announcement), like inflation and unemployment. There is a trade-off between the risk of external 
shocks and the usefulness of managing expectations in general and forward guidance in particular. The 
higher the uncertainty due to external shocks (about which the central bank has no control) the less 
credible will forward guidance. In an uncertain environment, the central bank should be very careful 
with the adoption of conditional announcements, as its credibility may be at stake.  
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After ECB cut the main refinancing operations (MRO) rate towards its effective lower bound in 2010, 
forward guidance became one of the few tools available to provide monetary accommodation 
(Eggertson and Woodford, 2003), together with liquidity provisions and asset purchases. Mario Draghi’s 
statement of 4 July 2013 “The Governing Council expects the key interest rates to remain at present or 
lower levels for an extended period of time.” marks the adoption of a new communication tool by the 
ECB: forward guidance on interest rates.  On 9 January 2014, Mario Draghi reinforced the use of this 
communication strategy: “we firmly reiterate our forward guidance that we continue to expect the key 
ECB interest rates to remain at present or lower levels for an extended period of time”. 
 
Figure 8: The effect of forward guidance announcements at different maturities 
 
Source: Hubert and Labondance (2017). 
 
Two types of forward guidance policy have been widely used by central banks so far. The Fed has 
adopted a time-contingent commitment from December 2008 to December 2012, which was 
afterwards replaced by a state-contingent commitment conditional on the evolution of the labour 
market. The Bank of England also introduced state-contingent forward guidance conditional on 
unemployment in August 2013. Similarly, the Bank of Japan used state-contingent forward guidance 
conditional on inflation between October 2010 and March 2013. The Bank of Canada implemented 
time-contingent forward guidance between April 2009 and April 2010, as did the Swedish Riksbank 
during two periods between April 2009 and July 2010 and between February 2013 and December 2014. 
Finally, the ECB implemented time-contingent forward guidance without referring to an end date or a 
precise period of time. 
Hubert and Labondance (2017) use a high-frequency methodology to estimate the effects of forward 
guidance, which focuses on movements in the overnight indexed swap (OIS) rates in a narrow window 
around ECB meetings. The OIS curve is a natural candidate to assess the impact of forward guidance as 
it represents a combination of short-term interest rate expectations and term premiums. 
Hubert and Labondance (2017) find that forward guidance announcements reduce OIS rates at most 
maturities. This result is stronger for longer maturities and persistent. Furthermore, controlling for 
private macroeconomic information sets in the empirical specification does not alter the negative 
effect of ECB forward guidance announcement on the term structure of interest rates. This suggests 
Central Bank Communication at Times of Non-Standard Monetary Policies 
 
PE 626.068 19 
that the effect of these announcements is more about the stance of future ECB monetary policy than 
about signalling ECB’s views about the macroeconomic outlook. 
3.3. “Whatever it takes” 
In July 2012, the eurozone was on the brink of collapse, with spreads of Italy and Spain hitting record 
levels, impeding access to capital markets. On 27 July 2012, speaking at a bankers’ forum in London, 
ECB President Mario Draghi made clear that the ECB “will do whatever it takes” to maintain the stability 
of the Eurozone. As a reaction, spreads went down significantly, without Draghi effectively using any 
policy tool. 
 
Figure 9: Italy and Spain: 10-year government bond yields 
 
Source: HSH Nordbank Economics, Macrobond. 
 
The same is true in the opposite direction. The European Central Bank (ECB) announced on 10 March 
2016 a series of additional measures to ease monetary policy. The QE program was extended both in 
terms of size - securities purchases increased from € 60bn to € 80bn per month - and of the types of 
financial securities eligible for purchases. The major innovation was the adoption of the new Targeted 
Longer-Term Refinancing Operations (TLTRO), featuring zero or even negative rates, depending on 
various criteria, including the amount of bank lending to households and businesses.  
Markets reaction to the announced measures was favourable. However, the communication at the 
press conference reduced some of the expected effects. In that occasion, Mario Draghi stated that "the 
ECB will no longer reduce interest rates", and, as a result, financial markets reassessed their views. While 
the announced Governing Council decisions were providing a loosening of monetary and financial 
conditions, Mario Draghi’s statement at the press conference that ECB's monetary policy could only be 
more restrictive going forward reshaped agents’ expectations of future policy. This well illustrates the 
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sensitivity of financial markets to “news” and also that policy gains of central banks communication 
may easily vanish.  
 
Figure 10: Euro-Dollar exchange rate on March 10, 2016 
 
Source: Boursorama. 
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 THE INFLUENCE OF CENTRAL BANK COMMUNICATION ON 
THE EFFECT OF POLICY DECISIONS 
Hubert (2017) assesses whether the central bank's publication of its macroeconomic forecasts affect 
economic agents’ assessment of monetary policy decisions and, ultimately, the effects of monetary 
policy on the economy at large. The study, based of BoE data6, investigates whether economic agents' 
interpretation of monetary policy decisions depends on the information at their disposal. More 
specifically, this work assesses whether the term structure of inflation expectations responds differently 
to BoE monetary policy decisions when a) central bank’s macroeconomic forecasts of inflation and 
growth are available, and b) policy decisions are confirmed or contradicted by the internal central bank 
macroeconomic forecasts published. 
 
Figure 11: Responses of inflation expectations to a restrictive monetary shock 
 
Source: Hubert (2017). 
 
The results suggest that, when monetary shocks and forecast surprises confirm each another, monetary 
shocks have a greater negative impact on private inflation expectations, possibly because economic 
agents are able to understand the reaction function of the central bank and therefore infer the true 
policy decision. When monetary shocks and forecast surprises send conflicting signals, monetary 
shocks do not show positive effects on inflation expectations, possibly because the conflicting signals 
prevent economic agents to determine the direction of monetary policy. Therefore, they respond to 
the macroeconomic information disclosed. These results show that central bank publication of 
macroeconomic information affects the information processing of private agents and modify their 
responses to monetary policy decisions.   
                                           
6  This paper focuses on UK data because BoE projections have a specific feature that makes it possible to identify 
econometrically their own effects. Indeed, the research question studied requires that the central bank's projections be 
not a function of the current policy decision, so that monetary surprises and projection surprises can be identified 
separately. BoE projections are conditional on the market interest rate and not the policy rate, so the BoE projections are 
independent of monetary policy decisions. 
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 CONCLUSION 
This policy brief aimed at emphasizing the role and the importance of communication in modern 
central banking. It has notably shed some lights on the role played by communication in normal and 
crisis period for enhancing the transmission of monetary policy. There is now a large body of evidence 
indicating that communication should be an important and powerful instrument in the toolkit of 
central banks. 
Announcement of QE from the ECB and the implementation of a forward guidance strategy have 
certainly been instrumental to stabilize the euro area economy, support the recovery and avoid 
deflation. As monetary policy normalise, the ECB should adopt and communicate a clear and consistent 
exit strategy. The aim is to manage a smooth and progressive increase in interest so as to avoid any 
sudden changes in financing conditions that would threaten the ongoing recovery and hamper 
financial stability.  
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Central banks have intensified their communication strategy since the mid 1990’s and it has become an 
important instrument of central banks’ policymaking toolkit. A large empirical evidence suggests that central 
bank communication has effectively enhanced the transmission of monetary policy before and during the 
financial crisis. Nevertheless, the use of communication as a policy instrument is fragile since it depends on 
economic agents’ perceptions and beliefs. It is crucial that central bank communication be consistent with 
policy decisions. 
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